New Hydro-geopolitical Developments in the 21st Century

Dursun Yıldız

Director

February  17 2026

Hydropolitics has long been underexplored, yet it is becoming increasingly important in shaping the international order. While analysts often focus on pipelines, rare earth elements, or trade corridors, water is emerging as the most critical resource in determining whether regions pursue cooperation or face conflict.

In the context of climate change and global food trade, “water-agriculture geopolitics” refers to the strategic interactions among countries over water resources and their impact on agriculture. Since the early 21st century, the growing importance of energy, food, and water has shifted hydropolitics from a neglected topic to a central focus in geopolitics. The search for a new hydropolitical order, defined by evolving rules and agreements on water management, has both shaped and been shaped by regional geopolitics. Notably, new developments in Africa and Asia have significantly influenced 21st-century hydro-geopolitics.

Africa

In this context, the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which altered the hydropolitics (the study and management of the political and strategic aspects of water resources) of the Nile River in Africa, was completed despite Egypt’s repeated threats. Furthermore, the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention (formally called the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which governs how countries share and manage rivers and lakes crossing borders) had been awaiting ratification in the parliaments of signatory countries for many years. At the beginning of the 21st century, this agreement was ratified by 14 African countries in their national parliaments, fulfilling the requirement of 35 countries, and thus gained international legal binding force in 2014. These countries include Namibia (2001), Libya (2005), Burkina Faso (2007), Mali (2009), Nigeria (2010), Benin (2011), Senegal (2012), Ivory Coast (2012), Chad (2013), Egypt (2013), Tunisia (2013), Niger (2014), Guinea-Bissau (2015), and Morocco (2019). African countries have played a significant role in giving international validity to the 1997 UN convention, which has long awaited ratification.

Africa has 63 transboundary river basins, shared by two or more countries, where about 60% of the population lives. In these areas, the interconnected challenges of managing water, energy, and food resources are most acute. The 1997 UN Convention’s principles of equitable and reasonable water use, and the obligation to avoid significant harm, have provided hydropolitical legitimacy for some African countries.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, initiated in 2011, began impounding water in 2023 and is now complete. However, issues such as flow regime, drought management, and data sharing remain key concerns for Sudan and Egypt. The US President has stated he will monitor the equitable use of this water, indicating continued US attention to hydro-geopolitical developments.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has fundamentally shifted the balance of power in the Nile Basin across legal, technical, and geopolitical dimensions. Egypt’s historical claims have been removed, reversing the previous “hydro-hegemony.” Threat-based diplomacy has failed, and the international system’s plan has secured energy for upstream countries. Downstream countries, Sudan and Egypt, now depend on the dam’s operation for water security. The Nile has become a critical issue linked to energy, water, and security. The White Nile tributary, carrying about 30% of the Nile’s flow from South Sudan, will be central to this new equation. Ethiopia will seek to include this tributary in the dam’s operating program, though this will likely face resistance. The Renaissance Dam has elevated the hydro-geopolitics of the Nile.

Central Asia

Recent developments have impacted the hydro-geopolitics of the Indus River basin in Asia. The 1960 Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan, once a model agreement, has stalled due to legal, technical, and geopolitical challenges. While the Kashmir dispute is the apparent cause, key factors include the treaty’s failure to address climate change, India’s expanded water use, and the World Bank’s reduced mediation role. India suspended the agreement, anticipating reduced river flow from climate change in the middle turn and growing domestic water demand. As a result, the treaty will require revision, marking the rise of new hydro-geopolitics in the region.

In Central Asia, the hydropolitics of the Amu Darya River are shifting due to a project by Afghanistan, historically the basin’s most marginalized actor. About 25-30% of the Amu Darya’s waters originate in Afghanistan. Excluded from Soviet-era water and energy planning, Afghanistan maintained a limited role due to geopolitical issues. In 2022, the Taliban began constructing the 280 km-long, 100 m-wide Kushtepa irrigation canal in northern Afghanistan, aiming to transfer large volumes of water from the Amu Darya to irrigate 600,000 hectares.

About 10 billion cubic meters of water will be diverted from the Amu Darya for this project, which will significantly reduce agricultural production in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan during droughts. Water shortages in these countries will increase, leading to substantial economic and ecological costs. Afghanistan has created a de facto situation, as it is not recognized by many countries and is not a party to international water-sharing agreements. This development will fundamentally change the region’s hydro-geopolitics, political relations, and water strategies. The hydropolitics and security systems of the Aral Sea basin will also be negatively affected. The Kushtepa Canal is transforming Afghanistan’s share of the Amu Darya into geopolitical influence for the first time.

Middle East

In the 21st century, the Euphrates and Tigris basins in the Middle East have become increasingly important as climate change and political uncertainty have intensified pressure on water resources.

Political instability and civil wars in Iraq and Syria have hindered long-term water cooperation in the basin. However, the 2024 water framework agreement between Turkey and Iraq signals a new approach to hydropolitical cooperation.

Ongoing instability in downstream countries and Turkey’s advancement of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) have produced a new hydro-geopolitical reality in the Tigris-Euphrates system. Water is now viewed as a resource that requires joint management, given climate change and regional development. The Syrian component remains incomplete due to continued instability.

The New Hydro-geopolitical Order

Since the early 21st century, the geopolitics of energy, water, and food have changed rapidly, driven by climate change and shifting regional balances. As climate impacts intensify, crises in food, water, and energy will increasingly intersect, reshaping security and creating new regional orders. A hydro-geopolitical order is most evident where water supply is declining, demand is rising, and transboundary basins exist. Forty percent of the world’s population lives in transboundary river and aquifer basins, with rates at 45% in Asia and 60% in Africa. While agreements exist in about two-thirds of these basins, only one-third are implemented.

Most of the implemented agreements are between developed countries in Europe and America, in the global North.

With 40% of the world’s population living in problematic transboundary watersheds, combined with climate change and geopolitical pressures, water has become a major geopolitical risk in the 21st century. Challenges will intensify in basins without joint management, data sharing, coordinated dam operations, or dispute-resolution mechanisms, highlighting the need for a new hydro-geopolitical order. To turn potential conflicts into cooperation, it is essential to move beyond rigid Cold War-era hydro-diplomacy and adopt flexible, win-win strategies that emphasize benefit sharing, joint projects, and innovative approaches.

This new hydropolitical approach requires consensus and cooperation on key issues, including avoiding the securitization of water, adopting flexible agreements, sharing water benefits and data, and establishing effective basin institutions.

Author

Dursun Yıldız (MSc.) is a hydropolitics specialist and the Director of the Hydropolitics Association, located in Ankara, Türkiye.He is a civil engineer and was formerly Deputy Director at the State Hydraulic Works in Türkiye; he completed a hydroinformatics postgraduate course at the IHE in Delft, a technical training programme at USBR-USA, and a master’s degree in Hydropolitics at Hacettepe University, Türkiye